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Kierkegaard’s essay on the tragic in the first volume of Either/Or, “The Tragic in Ancient 
Drama Reflected in the Tragic in Modern Drama,” is possibly among the most frequently 
discussed and misunderstood of his works. The misunderstandings largely derive from 
the tendency in the scholarly literature to view the text in light of Hegel’s more famous 
theory of tragedy, something likely due to the fact that Kierkegaard, too, draws on 
Sophocles’ Antigone for his analysis. This approach, however, has obscured the 
originality of Kierkegaard’s contribution, which centers on two basic claims of far-
reaching consequences for the theory of the genre and for philosophy more generally. 
The first is the claim that the essence of tragedy in all its historical manifestations 
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consists in the representation of an irreducible contradiction between two qualitatively 
distinct principles: substantial determinants and individual agency. The second is 
Kierkegaard’s contention that, within this essence, the difference between the genre’s 
ancient and its modern forms rests on the different relations to that contradiction, on 
whether it is accepted as an objective fact or as a reflexive possibility. In the present 
article I will elucidate Kierkegaard’s argument in terms of these two claims and point to 
some of their larger implications. With respect to the first, I show that it introduces a 
significant challenge to the conception of historical time on which our category of 
modernity depends.  As concerns the second, I argue that it constitutes an engagement 
with what Kant calls as the modality of judgments (whether an object is possible, actual, 
or necessary), which Kierkegaard here attacks in the version given to it by the young 
F.W.J. Schelling. Kierkegaard’s rejection of Schelling’s argument on this point goes to 
the heart of the idealist project and ultimately questions what the form of philosophy 
should be. 
I. Essence 
As is indicated by the title of his essay, “The Tragic in Ancient Drama Reflected in the 
Tragic in Modern Drama,” Kierkegaard’s explicit project in this text is to examine the 
relation between ancient and modern tragedy, and to show, as he puts it, “how the 
characteristic feature of the tragic in ancient drama is incorporated in the tragic in 
modern drama” (“hvorledes det for det antike Tragiske Eiendommelige lader sig optage 
indenfor det moderne Tragiske”; Either/Or I 140 / Enten-Eller I 140).1 The essay, which 
is addressed by a pseudonymous author “A” to a society of like-minded companions 
referred to as the “Symparanekromenoi” (the fellowship of buried lives or living dead; 
137 / 137), is divided into two almost perfectly equal halves, separated only by a long 
exhortation to the audience. The first half of the essay provides a theoretical analysis of 
tragedy in its ancient and modern forms, while the second offers a retelling of the story 
of Antigone as an example of what modern tragedy should look like. In both halves, the 
analysis is centered on three categories—action, guilt, and mood—the order of which is 
merely inverted in the second half.  
Kierkegaard begins his discussion in the essay’s first half by arguing that the 
action in ancient tragedy is determined not only by the individual character’s agency but 
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also by the “substantial determinants” in which he or she rests: “in the state, the family, 
in fate” (“i Stat, Familie, i Skjæbne”; 143 / 143). What this means is that the plot of 
ancient tragedy is not merely a product of an individual’s autonomous decisions, but 
also of the conditions imposed upon that individual by forces that exceed it, and over 
which it has no control. As Kierkegaard puts it, the action of ancient tragedy is not just 
“action” but “event,” where the Danish word for “event,” “Begivenhed,” makes clear that 
it is something given to the character rather than produced by it (ibid.; my italics). The 
hero of tragedy is thus caught between events of which he or she is the direct source 
(those actions that we will), and events that are imposed from outside, as historical, 
social, or metaphysical restrictions on what we can do. No amount of willing, for 
example, can change the fundamental limitations based on us by our biology (such as 
our finitude), or by the fact that we are born into one family rather than another (for 
example, the guilt our ancestors incurred and for which we are made to pay). The 
events of Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex can be taken as paradigmatic in this respect, since 
they can be read as the outcome both of the hero’s individual decisions and of the fate 
that predetermined them.  
In contrast to this, Kierkegaard argues, substantial determinants have 
disappeared in modern tragedy, since the conception of individuality in modernity 
stipulates that each person is fully autonomous and free. In modern tragedy, that is, 
“What concerns us is a certain specific element of [the hero’s] life as his own deed” 
(“Det, der beskæftiger os, er et vist bestemt Moment af hans Liv som hans egen 
Gjerning”; ibid., my italics), which is to say that it is possible to fully explain the 
motivation for occurrences merely by reference to the hero’s particular character (144 / 
143). From a modern perspective, not only are there no limits to what we can will but 
everything that happens, does so only because a specific individual has caused it, 
leaving any supra-individual agent out of the equation. 
This distinction between ancient and modern tragedy repeats itself in 
Kierkegaard’s discussion of the guilt operative in each. In ancient tragedy, Kierkegaard 
explains, guilt vacillates between the individual and the substantial determinants: the 
responsibility for the tragic events we witness can be ascribed both to the hero and to 
the forces of state, family or fate over which he or she can exercise no control (144 / 
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143-4). (Oedipus, again, is a clear instance.) In modern tragedy, on the contrary, the 
absence of substantial determinants means that the individual is fully responsible for the 
misfortunes that occur (ibid.). Unlike the ancients, when we moderns want to determine 
the guilt of a transgression we do not take into consideration anything except the 
individual itself, and any reference to attenuating circumstances of family, state or fate 
leave us completely cold. As Kierkegaard puts it: “if a criminal before the judge wants to 
excuse himself by saying that his mother had a propensity for stealing, especially during 
the time she was pregnant with him, the judge obtains the health officer’s opinion of his 
mental condition and decides that he is dealing with a thief and not with the thief’s 
mother” (“Naar derfor en Forbryder vil undskylde sig for Dommeren med, at hans Moder 
have Hang til at stjæle og især i den Tid, da hun gik frugtsommelig med ham, saa 
indhenter Dommeren Sundheds-Collegiets Betænkning om hans mentale Tilstand og 
mener, at han har med Tyven at gjøre og ikke med Tyvens Moder”; 145-6 / 145). 
The final category of mood replicates this pattern. Corresponding to the two 
principles of individual and substantial determinants, the central emotions of tragedy 
identified by Kierkegaard are sorrow and pain. The former is the effect of the individual’s 
guiltlessness, his or her subjection to substantial determinants, while pain is the 
response to an individual’s guilt. True tragic sorrow, Kierkegaard points out, accordingly 
always contains an element of pain, since the individual’s innocence is always 
accompanied by responsibility for what happens. Inversely, true tragic pain must contain 
an element of sorrow, since in tragedy proper all individual agency is counteracted by its 
subordination to forces it cannot control (151 / 150). Given the constitution of its action 
and guilt, however, modern tragedy departs from this balance and instead tends 
exclusively towards pain. Ancient tragedy, on the other hand, retains both emotions, 
although sorrow is predominant (147-8 / 147-8).  
A number of important points can be derived from Kierkegaard’s discussion so 
far. First, it should be emphasized that, to Kierkegaard, the primacy of the principle of 
individuality in modern tragedy is “misguided” (“misforstaaede”) and a 
“misunderstanding” (“Misforstaaelse”; 144 / 144), since it constitutes a move away from 
tragedy proper. In modern tragedy, as he writes: 
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We want to know nothing about the hero’s past; we load his whole life upon 
his shoulders as his own deed, make him accountable for everything, but in 
so doing we also transform his esthetic guilt into ethical guilt. In this way, the 
tragic hero becomes bad, evil actually becomes the tragic subject, but evil 
has no esthetic interest, and sin is not an esthetic element. (144)  
Man vil ikke vide Noget af Heltens Fortid at sige, man vælter hele hans Liv 
paa hans Skuldre som hans egen Gjerning, gjør ham tilregnelig for Alt, men 
derved forvandler man ogsaa hans æsthetiske Skyld til en ethisk. Den 
tragiske Helt bliver saaledes slet, det Onde bliver egentlig den tragiske 
Gjenstand, men det Onde har ingen æsthetisk Interesse og Synd er ikke et 
æsthetisk Element. (144) 
The problem, for Kierkegaard, is that in making the individual fully responsible for his or 
her actions, modernity looses the “ambiguous guiltlessness” (“tvetydige Uskyldighed”; 
ibid.) and “esthetic ambiguity” (“æsthetiske Tvetydighed”; 148 / 147) that is the essence 
of tragedy and which is the result of the fact that we cannot determine whether actions, 
guilt, and sorrow are governed by substantial determinants or by individual agency. 
Instead, modern drama moves towards the comic and the ethical, which ultimately lead 
to despair by placing all responsibility on the individual and demanding a self-sufficiency 
that we cannot actually provide. As Kierkegaard puts it: 
One would think that the generation in which I have the honor of living must 
be a kingdom of gods. But this is by no means so: the vigor, the courage, that 
wants to be the creator of its own good fortune in this way, indeed, its own 
creator, is an illusion, and when the age loses the tragic, it gains despair. In 
the tragic there is implicit a sadness and a healing that one indeed must not 
disdain, and when someone wishes to gain himself in the superhuman way 
our age tries to do it, he loses himself and becomes comic. Every individual, 
however original he is, is still a child of God, of his age, of his nation, of his 
family, of his friends, and only in them does he have his truth. If he wants to 
be the absolute in all this, his relativity, then he becomes ludicrous. (145) 
Man skulde nu troe, at det maatte være et Kongerige af Guder, den Slægt, 
hvori ogsaa jeg har den Ære at leve. Imidlertid er det ingenlunde saa, den 
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Kraftfuldhed, det Mod, der saaledes vil være sin egen Lykkes Skaber, ja sin 
egen Skaber, er en Illusion, og idet Tiden taber det Tragiske, vinder den 
Fortvivlelsen. Der ligger en Veemod og en Lægedom i det Tragiske, som 
man i Sandhed ikke skal forsmaae, og idet man paa den overnaturlige 
Maade, som vor Tid forsøger det, vil vinde sig selv, taber man sig selv, og 
man bliver comisk. Ethvert Individ, hvor oprindeligt det er, er dog Guds, sin 
Tids, sit Folks, sin Families, sine Venners Barn, først heri har det sin 
Sandhed, vil det i hele denne sin Relativitet være det Absolute, saa bliver det 
latterligt. (144)  
The project of modern tragedy, as that of modernity more generally, is doomed to failure 
since it contradicts the truth of our condition, according to which we are always subject 
to substantial determinants of some kind. By imputing all events to the specific agent, 
the dream of god-like autonomy not only introduces evil and despair, but also becomes 
comic when it turns out that this in fact cannot be done.  
The only alternatives to the despair generated by the ethical are the tragic and 
the religious, which here reveal themselves as structural analogues. In both cases, the 
individual’s responsibility is attenuated by placing it in the context of conditions that he 
or she cannot control: the substantial determinants of ancient tragedy and the religious 
notion of original sin (146 / 145). The ambiguous guiltlessness and aesthetic ambiguity 
of ancient tragedy protects us from despair by placing part of the responsibility for our 
crimes in circumstances that exceed us, in the same way that the notion of original sin 
in the religious forgives us for our faults by acknowledging that we could not have 
prevented them no matter how much we try. The difference between the tragic and the 
religious is simply that the former is operative only prior to the emergence of the ethical, 
that is, before we conceive of the individual as a fully autonomous and responsible 
agent, whereas the consolation of the religious steps in only after such a determination 
of the subject has occurred. In the tragic we remain uncertain of the individual’s guilt 
because the notion of individuality as solely responsible is not yet fully operative, 
whereas the notion of original sin maintains our relative innocence even after that 
concept of the individual has been asserted. As Kierkegaard sums up: “And what, after 
all, is human life, the human race, when these two things are taken away? Either the 
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sadness of the tragic or the profound sorrow and profound joy of religion” (“Og hvad er 
dog, naar man tager disse to Ting bort, Menneskelivet, hvad er Menneskeslægten? 
Enten det Tragiskes Veemod, eller Religionens dybe Sorg og dybe Glæde”; 146 / 146). 
Without them, we only have comic despair.  
The second point to note about Kierkegaard’s discussion so far is that this 
conception of the essence of tragedy runs counter to the standard view of the genre 
during the period.2 What Kierkegaard joins into a single dialectical relation is in fact 
traditionally kept strictly separate, as the features of sharply distinct historical periods: 
the drama of the ancient Greeks, in which only abstract social, moral or religious 
principles are at work, and the drama of the moderns, where the conflict is between 
particular individuals, in all their contingent specificity. To name only some of the more 
famous examples in this line of thought, the distinction occurs already in Herder’s 1773 
essay on Shakespeare, where he argues that “the drama of Sophocles and 
Shakespeare . . . are two things that in a certain sense barely have their name in 
common” (“Sophokles Drama und Shakespeares Drama . . . zwei Dinge [sind], die im 
gewißen Betracht kaum den Namen gemein haben”; 105 3) because they derive from 
fundamentally distinct cultures, the Nordic and the Greek. The point is developed a year 
later by Jakob Michael Reinhold Lenz, who distinguishes between the Greek (and 
French) drama concerned with fate and the ideal and the English (Nordic) drama of 
characters and actuality (650, 653). In 1795, Friedrich Schlegel radicalizes the same 
opposition still further in his seminal essay “Über das Studium der griechischen Poesie.” 
Modern literature, we read there, is “anarchic” (219), subject to “chance” rather than 
principles and rules (221), and seeks to represent only the particular, characteristic and 
interesting (228). The culmination of these features is found in the moderns’ predilection 
for “philosophical tragedy,” which stands in direct opposition to the “aesthetic tragedy” of 
the ancient Greeks that, like all classical art, aims at beauty, universality and objectivity 
(246; cf. 277, 283, 396). The same characterization recurs in the influential Vorlesungen 
über dramatische Kunst und Literatur by Friedrich’s brother August Wilhelm Schlegel, 
first published in 1809-1811. As the older Schlegel explains there, Greek art proceeds 
“with scientific rigor from the most universal concept . . . so that the individual was by far 
the last thing to which it declined” (“mit gleichsam wissenschaftlicher Strenge von dem 
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allgemeinsten Begriffe . . . so daß das Individuelle durchaus das letzte war, wozu sie 
herabsank”); whereas we moderns do it “exactly the other way around” (“gerade 
umgekehrt”; 1: 54). Greek tragedy represents the “idea,” “fate,” or “myth,” and lacks the 
immediacy and color of everyday life (1: 61, 62, 66), while the moderns provide the 
experience of reality, although as chaos rather than nomos, fragments and particulars 
that cannot be exhausted by conceptual determination (2: 111-2, 130). The tradition 
reaches its apex with Goethe, who in his 1813 essay “Shakespeare und kein Ende!” 
returns to this division. Greek art, Goethe concurs, is governed by necessity, “sollen,” 
while the moderns instead operate with freedom and willing (“wollen”; 291). The world of 
ancient tragedy thus belongs to “reason,” “Vernunft,” “like the law of morals and 
government, or that of nature, like the laws of becoming, growth, and passing way, of 
life and death” (“wie das Sitten- und Stadtgesetz, oder der Natur, wie die Gesetze des 
Werdens, Wachsens und Vergehens, des Lebens und Todes”). But the world of modern 
drama is free and “favors the individual” (“begünstigt den Einzelnen”; ibid.) rather than 
universal laws. Most famously, perhaps, the same view stands at the heart of Hegel’s 
influential discussion of the genre in his Vorlesungen über Ästhetik, where, again, the 
heroes of antiquity are said to embody substantive principles of state, morality or 
religion, and therefore act with absolute necessity, while those of modernity are caught 
in subjectivity and chance (536).  
The pervasiveness of this distinction between ancient and modern tragedy is not 
merely a consequence of theoretical pedantry. Quite to the contrary, its importance 
derives from the fact that the Goethezeit itself inherits it from the Querelle des Anciens 
et des Modernes that dominated the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries—in 
Germany all the way up to the polemics between Johann Christoph Gottsched and 
Jakob Bodmer.4 The solution to the Querelle, it is usually acknowledged, came with the 
general acceptance of the view that the whole project of determining the relative 
superiority of the ancients or the moderns was based on the mistaken assumption that 
different historical periods can be evaluated according to the same standard of 
measurement or set of rules. Instead, as became increasingly clear towards the close of 
the seventeenth century, different cultures and periods operate according to distinct 
rules and criteria and therefore must be judged on their own terms.  
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As scholars such as Hans Robert Jauss and Reinhart Koselleck have long 
argued, it is this perception of the qualitative difference of historical periods that gives 
birth to our notion of modernity, which means that the division of the genre of tragedy 
into two distinct varieties, each with their own structural properties, in fact articulates 
one of the most basic binaries of our period.5 On the same account, however, by 
insisting that tragedy should not be understood as governed either by substantial 
principles or by individual agency, but rather by the dialectical relation of the two, 
Kierkegaard is not merely departing from the standard view of the genre during the 
Goethezeit but also putting into play the foundations for our notion of history itself.6  
 Finally, the argument so far also makes it possible to revise two of the most 
persistent views about his essay in the scholarly literature. The first is the claim that 
Kierkegaard follows Hegel in equating the tragedy of the ancients simply with 
substantial principles.  In his influential book Antigones, for example, George Steiner 
describes Kierkegaard’s argument as a distinction between, on the one hand, tragedy 
that is fully “action-centered” (the ancients), and, on the other, tragedy that is fully 
“psychological” (the moderns). As Steiner explains: “All this, of course, is pure Hegel” 
(55).7  In an earlier contribution, Walter Rehm similarly points to Hegel’s Vorlesungen 
über Ästhetik as the most important source for Kierkegaard’s discussion and also 
equates his notion of ancient tragedy with pure substantiality, in opposition to the 
reflection of the moderns (279, 284-5, 290). Jon Stewart, in his important study 
Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, is more emphatic still, stating that 
“Kierkegaard took to heart Hegel’s analysis of the distinction between ancient and 
modern tragedy and applied Hegel’s characterization of the modern notion of tragedy to 
the story of Antigone” (218). Isak Winkel Holm likewise claims that ancient tragedy for 
Kierkegaard is centered on the conflict between the substantive principles of family and 
state, which he also points out, is merely a repetition of Hegel’s famous interpretation 
(154).8 Insofar as Kierkegaard holds that the essence of tragedy consists in the 
simultaneity of both substantial determinants and individual agency, it is clear that these 
assertions must be mistaken. Rather than a repetition of Hegel’s view, Kierkegaard 
dramatically breaks with it by joining into one what Hegel keeps separate as attributes 
of distinct historical moments. 
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 The second scholarly view in need of revision in fact recognizes Kierkegaard’s 
insistence on a duality of principles in tragedy but not its importance. Clyde Holler, for 
example, in his contribution to the International Kierkegaard Commentary to Either/Or, 
initially notes the duality at work in Kierkegaard’s conception of ancient tragedy. But, 
somewhat oddly, he attributes the same structure to Hegel before it disappears from his 
discussion (131-2). Also Daniel Greenspan, in his book The Passion of Infinity, at one 
point identifies the indeterminacy that Kierkegaard discusses in his notion of the tragic 
in antiquity (144-6), but then asserts that Kierkegaard did not believe the ancients in fact 
had tragedy in a proper sense, which Greenspan instead takes him to think will only find 
its true actualization in Christianity (149-50). A similar position is held by Karsten Friis 
Johansen, who likewise momentarily points out the duality of substantial determinants 
and individual agency in Kierkegaard’s conception of the Greeks (116-7) but, like 
Greenspan, asserts that this means the ancient’s did not have tragedy after all and that 
it has not yet been found (118-9). As I have shown, however, according to Kierkegaard, 
the simultaneity of opposed principles is neither irrelevant nor a mistake or deficiency of 
ancient tragedy but rather the proof of its adherence to the essence of the genre.9  
II. Difference 
The fact that, on Kierkegaard’s view, modern tragedy as we have it betrays the essence 
of the genre by reducing it to just one of its constitutive terms (that of individual 
freedom), should not be taken to mean that Kierkegaard believes that tragedy is dead. 
Quite to the contrary, the second part of the essay provides a prescriptive account in 
which Kierkegaard specifies what modern tragedy should look like. Central to this part 
of the argument is Kierkegaard’s assertion that what must distinguish ancient from 
modern tragedy is not, as the standard view assumes, the contradiction present within 
each—the ambiguous relation between substantial determinants and individual agency 
that constitutes the essence of the tragic in all its manifestations—but rather the 
relationship to that contradiction.  
As mentioned earlier, Kierkegaard claims with respect to ancient tragedy that its 
mood is a combination of sorrow and pain, although with a predominance of the former. 
The reason for this predominance is not that there is more substantial determination to 
the plot than there is individual agency, but rather that the events of ancient tragedy are 
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related to in objective terms, as given and unchangeable facts, rather than subjectively, 
through reflection. As Kierkegaard puts it, in ancient tragedy “A moment of [individual] 
guilt always remains, but this moment is not actually reflected subjectively; this is why 
the sorrow in Greek tragedy is so profound” (“Et Moment af Skyld bliver der altid tilbage, 
men dette Moment er egentlig ikke subjectiv reflekteret; derfor er Sorgen i den græske 
Tragedie saa dyb”). And again, shortly thereafter: “Thus the moment of [individual] guilt 
that remains [in ancient tragedy] is not subjectively reflected, and this makes the sorrow 
profound” (“Det Moment altsaa af Skyld, der bliver tilbage, er ikke subjectivt reflekteret, 
og dette gjør Sorgen dyb”; 149-50, trans. modified / 149). According to Kierkegaard, the 
transition from one way of relating to tragic contradiction to the other is marked (albeit 
still imperfectly) in Sophocles’ tragedy Philoctetes, where reflection is introduced for the 
first time in the form of the hero’s doubt and question: “Why is this happening to me; can 
it not be otherwise?” (“hvorfor vederfares dette mig, kan det ikke være anderledes”; 151 
/ 150). Here the ambiguous relation between individual guilt and substantial 
determinants is no longer merely accepted as a fact, but rather questioned, taken as 
something that the hero seeks to determine precisely, even if that effort must inevitably 
fail given that we cannot clearly distinguish the respective contributions of each 
principle. Where for the ancients proper the simultaneity of freedom and objective 
coercion is a brute fact of life, the moderns seek (or should seek) to unearth the 
conditions that can account for its possibility. 
The stakes of this difference between ancients and moderns can best be 
elucidated through the third kind of relation to tragic contradiction that Kierkegaard 
invokes, namely that of the religious. In a crucial passage of his essay, Kierkegaard 
writes: 
The real reason people have always had scruples about calling the life of 
Christ a tragedy is that they felt that esthetic categories do not exhaust the 
matter. That the life of Christ is something more than can be exhausted in 
esthetic categories is apparent also in another way – namely, that these 
neutralize themselves in this phenomenon and are rendered inconsequential. 
Tragic action always contains an element of suffering, and tragic suffering an 
element of action; the esthetic lies in their relativity. The identity of an 
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absolute action and an absolute suffering is beyond the powers of the 
esthetic and belongs to the metaphysical. In the life of Christ there is this 
identity, for his suffering is absolute, since it is absolutely free action, and his 
action is absolute suffering, since it is absolute obedience. (150)  
Det er egentlig Grunden til, at man altid har undseet sig for at kalde Christi 
Liv en Tragedie, fordi man følte, at æsthetiske Bestemmelser ikke udtømme 
Sagen. Ogsaa paa en anden Maade viser det sig, at Christi Liv er Mere, end 
hvad der lader sig udtømme i æsthetiske Bestemmelser; derved, at disse 
neutralisere sig paa dette Phænomen og stilles i Indifferens. Den tragiske 
Handling har altid et Moment af Liden i sig, og den tragiske Liden et Moment 
af Handling, det Æsthetiske ligger i Relativiteten. Identiteten af en absolut 
Handlen og en absolut Liden er over det Æsthetiskes Kræfter og tilhører det 
Metaphysiske. I Christi Liv er denne Identitet, thi hans Liden er absolut, da 
den er absolut fri Handlen, og hans Handlen er absolut Liden, da den er 
absolut Lydighed. (149) 
Christ does not to qualify as tragic even though his condition involves a contradiction 
between passivity and agency, between a suffering that he cannot control and has not 
chosen and being an agent of salvation through his own will (cf. also 142-3 /142). The 
reasons Kierkegaard gives for why Christ is not tragic in spite of this—or, strictly 
speaking, why he is “more” than tragic—are twofold. On the one hand, the notion of an 
identity of opposites runs counter to the ambiguity within the aesthetic. On the other, the 
claim that the principles thus joined are absolute contradicts the relativity of individual 
agency and passivity that Kierkegaard associates with tragedy. In the above passage, 
these claims appear to mean quite simply that, to Kierkegaard, the nature of either of 
the principles at stake in tragedy cannot be determined unequivocally (absolutely) 
because in tragedy either one always contains an element of its opposite. This links up 
with the argument traced earlier, namely that the aesthetic in Kierkegaard’s essay is 
understood to precede the conception of the individual as fully autonomous, while the 
religious follows it. And in more general terms, the point resonates with Kant’s claim in 
the second moment of the “Analytik des Schönen,” in the Kritik der Urtheilskraft, that 
aesthetic judgments do not determine their object (211-9). If this is so, then aesthetics 
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cannot operate with concepts that are fully specified, since that would constitute a 
determinate cognition, the way that Christ’s innocence must be absolutely certain and 
not leave anything ambiguous or up to further specification.  
But the issues involved in this passage in fact run much deeper, even though the 
translation tends to obscure this point. In the Danish original, Kierkegaard’s term for 
“inconsequential” is “Indifferens,” which together with terms like “identity” and “absolute” 
make it clear that he is alluding to the philosophy of the young Friedrich Schelling, for 
whom these are central concepts.10 In rejecting the claim that Christ is tragic, 
Kierkegaard is accordingly not only making a claim about the representational nature of 
art, but also rejecting the more fundamental claim that art provides us with access to the 
metaphysical ground of all experience, as Schelling argues most influentially in his 
System des transzendentalen Idealismus, from 1800. It is not, significantly, that 
Kierkegaard here denies in itself the possibility of such a metaphysical ground in which 
all opposites are reconciled, but only the claim that it is available to us in any way other 
than that of the religious.11 Indeed, lined up with the two other, aesthetic forms of 
relating to the contradiction of objective necessity and individual freedom that the essay 
offers us, it is clear that the religious is constitutive since it provides a complement that 
turns all three into a sequence. For the moderns, the clash between individual agency 
and supra-individual necessity is indeterminate and merely possible; for the ancients, its 
occurrence is a fact, which makes it actual; and in the religious it is necessary since the 
opposing terms are recognized to be identical.  
To understand the importance of the presence of the possible, actual, and 
necessary in Kierkegaard’s distinction between different kinds of relation to the tragic it 
is necessary to note that they invoke not only Schelling but also the Kritik der reinen 
Vernunft, where Kant lists these three categories under the title of modality (A80 / 
B10612). A full examination of Kierkegaard’s argument must therefore go back to that 
context. For the purposes here, it is sufficient simply to recall that the categories of 
modality to Kant differ from all other categories in that they do not contribute anything to 
the content of a judgment. Instead, the determination of an object’s modal status 
depends on the relation that it has to each of our cognitive faculties: understanding 
(which determines possibility), judgment (which is responsible for asserting actuality), 
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and reason (which places the particular cognition in relation to a whole that makes it 
necessary).13  
In his Vom Ich als Princip der Philosophie, from 1795, Schelling, for his part, 
draws on Kant to describe the relation of the modal categories in terms of a dialectic of 
temporal determinations (117-9; cf. Kant, Kritik der reinen A144-5 / B184). Possibility is 
the thesis in the process, which consists in the assertion of an object’s agreement with 
the conditions of time as such, “Zeit überhaupt.” Here we identify only the conditions 
under which anything at all can become an object of time, which means the 
characteristics shared by all temporal determinations. Actuality provides the antithesis 
to this condition insofar as it consists in the assertion of individual moments, a 
“bestimmte Zeit,” in terms of the unique specifications that define each moment’s 
difference from all others. Necessity, finally, is the synthesis of the first two categories, 
the determination of an object in relation to all time, “alle Zeit.” This final category 
consists in the expression of the content of actuality in the form of possibility, which here 
include the characteristics of universality and unity. What we find in necessity, 
accordingly, is the sum of all particular moments organized in a system of universal 
laws, which means that the judgment that any one moment is necessary consists in the 
assertion of its participation in, or contribution to, such a totality.  
Since we never have all moments of experience available to us, there are only 
two kinds of objects that for Schelling exhibit the category of necessity in this way: 
organisms of nature and works of art, both of which have the same structure. What we 
do when we judge that we are dealing with an organism is place a present moment (a 
“bestimmte Zeit”) in relation to the idea of all the moments (“alle Zeit”) that constitute the 
organism as a whole. In such situations we present the non-I confronting us (the 
distinct, particular moment inexplicable on its own) in terms of the conditions of the I 
(the rational criteria of identity and universality proper to possibility) by determining it as 
a part that derives its meaning from the harmonious whole to which it contributes (the 
synthesis of necessity).  
The crucial difference between Kant and Schelling, of course, is that the former 
takes the necessity of organic structures to be only a regulative principle, a 
consequence merely of the structures of our cognition, which does not guarantee in any 
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way that such ideas of reason in fact are real. To Schelling, in contrast, the organic 
structures that we find in nature and art give expression within the realm of temporality 
to the identity of the absolute that underlies it. That is, in Schelling’s view, there must be 
an absolute identity between freedom and necessity that precedes and makes possible 
finite experience,14 and what judgments of necessity do is simply recreate that 
metaphysical ground within the empirical world. As he puts it at one point: “Organisms 
in general are therefore nothing but the reduced and so to speak contracted image of 
the universe” (“Die Organisation im allgemeinen ist also nichts anderes als das 
verkleinerte und gleichsam zusammengezogenen Bild des Universums”; System 161).15  
Why does Kierkegaard reject this view? The answer seems to lie with the 
different notion of freedom that Kierkegaard draws on in his deployment of the modal 
categories. In Schelling, freedom and possibility consist in rational self-determination, so 
that knowledge resides in the imposition of the principles of the agent’s reason on the 
irrational world of the non-I. The possibility of a synthesis between them derives from 
the assertion that the irrational opposing us ultimately is governed by the same rational 
structure as ourselves, which is what the I gradually uncovers through the process of 
streben that conquers that which opposes reason in the realms of thought or action. In 
Kierkegaard’s account of tragedy, however, it is possible to say that this relation has 
been radicalized and inverted by making the notion of the irrational fully independent 
and giving it epistemic priority. Precisely because Kierkegaard is combining the 
characteristics of ancient and modern tragedy, the notion of individual freedom that he 
deploys is the one proper to the latter, which is defined in terms of chance and 
particularity inherently at odds with necessity and universality. Rather than tying 
individual freedom to reason and moral self-determination, that is, the agent in 
Kierkegaard is free to choose evil as well as good, and therefore is no longer bound by 
normative constraints but rather to a principle applicable only to him- or herself.16 
Indeed, in “The Tragic in Ancient Drama,” it seems that individual agency is always 
agency against the objective moral order, since in the modern world where the 
individual reigns supreme the hero is always presented as being evil. This also means 
that objectivity and universality cannot be attributes of subjectivity, which is why 
Kierkegaard instead ascribes these to supra-individual categories to which the subject is 
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ultimately irreducible (the categories of family, fate, the state), and which now oppose 
us as something other. 
In Schelling it is the guarantee that reason underlies particularity, or that 
particularity can be expressed in rational terms, which secures the ultimate 
reconciliation of opposites. But in Kierkegaard individuality has become fully severed 
from rational constraints so that there is no inherent relation between the two. From 
within human experience, accordingly, there cannot be any transition from one pole of 
the contradiction to the other, since the two are now wholly at odds. That is, the relation 
between the conditions of experience as we know them—in which contradiction must be 
real—and the absolute—in which contradiction does not exist—is no longer merely 
quantitative or relative, as it is for the young Schelling, but rather absolute and 
qualitative, a gap that can never be overcome by merely human means. As Kierkegaard 
puts it in his later The Sickness unto Death: “As sinner, man is separated from God by 
the most chasmal qualitative abyss” (“Som Synder er Mennesket adskilt fra Gud ved 
Qvalitetens meest svælgende Dyb”; Sickness 122 / Sygdommen 233).  
 This re-conception of the tragic conflict in Kierkegaard as one between 
qualitatively rather than quantitatively distinct terms serves to explain why he rejects the 
idea of a non-religious access to their reconciliation in the category of necessity: we 
simply do not have a modality of knowledge able to show how objective necessity and 
individual freedom are compatible. But it also makes it possible to determine more 
precisely the difference between the two modes of relation to that contradiction that do 
fall within the realm of human experience, namely that between ancient and modern 
tragedy. As established above, Kierkegaard’s claim is that the ancients relate to the 
contradiction between freedom and necessity in the modality of actuality, while the 
moderns do so in that of possibility. On the basis of the preceding discussion, this claim 
has to be understood specifically in the sense that the ancients relate the contradiction 
to the faculty or principles that constitute objectivity, so that they determine the relation 
in terms of those attributes of universality and identity shared by the conflicting terms. 
Individual freedom in a tragic situation viewed by the ancients would in that case be 
assessed in terms of that which allows it to participate in an order of events common to 
more than one subject (although the fact that individual freedom agrees with such an 
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objective order in a given instance would itself remain contingent). The moderns, in turn, 
must be taken to view the same contradiction in the opposite direction, in terms of the 
qualities of individual freedom and difference held in common by the conflicting sides. In 
the modern relation to tragedy, that is, the objective constraints in a tragic situation are 
viewed in relation to those of its attributes or principles that make it partake of the 
condition of freedom, which is to say that what modern tragedy does is assert the non-
objective dimension of objectivity. Or, more strictly, in ancient tragedy the relation 
between freedom and necessity in a given situation is assessed in terms of the criteria 
that account for the fact that the situation could be what it is, while in modern tragedy it 
is assessed in terms of the criteria that account for the fact that the situation in which 
they meet could have been different.  
In Kant and Schelling, then, possibility is agreement with the conditions common 
to all actual experience (the categories). But in Kierkegaard freedom and subjectivity 
are not tied to rationality, and possibility is therefore instead linked to the condition of 
change and differentiation. Put differently, where possibility in Kant and Schelling is 
possibility of objectivity and identity, in Kierkegaard it is possibility of subjectivity and 
change. To relate to the relation between freedom and substantial determinants in a 
tragic situation in terms of its possibility, as occurs in modern tragedy, is accordingly not 
to identify its conditions of objectivity, but rather the conditions of difference it might 
contain. This is a perception of the given close to what Kierkegaard later would call 
historical faith, or faith sensu laxiori, in which we can only grasp the historical meaning 
of events if we view them in relation to all the things they could have been but were 
denied by their actualization in a specific way (see Philosophical 72-86 / Philosophiske 
272-82).17 That is not to say that objectivity is not operative for Kierkegaard, since he 
insists that we cannot have a reduction of either pole in the tragic contradiction to its 
opposite. But it is to say that actuality can always be questioned in its objectivity insofar 
as it necessarily carries a transcendental ground of difference at its foundation. If 
substantial determinants do coerce us, it is not clear how far their power stretches since 
they could have been different, which means that it is not clear why they are the way 
they are or whom or what we should hold responsible for that fact. And that also means, 
finally, that tragedy for Kierkegaard is not the organon for absolute necessity and 
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certainty it is for Schelling. To the contrary, in Kierkegaard, tragedy in its modern form is 
governed by the category of doubt and consists in the representation of the ground of 
freedom and contingency that underlies the world. Tragedy is not the condition for us to 
come to consciousness of the absolute, but of its radical absence.18  
This is the situation of the modern Antigone that Kierkegaard describes in the 
second part of “The Tragic in Ancient Drama.” As mentioned, Kierkegaard’s discussion 
in this half of the essay repeats the same three categories of the first—action, guilt, and 
mood—albeit in the inverse order. With respect to mood, Kierkegaard’s version of 
Sophocles’ play follows the requirements of ancient tragedy by combining pain and 
sorrow. But now we are told that the specifically modern element lies in the fact that the 
relation to these two emotions takes the form of “anxiety” (“Angst”), which is a mode of 
reflection and therefore proper to modernity and its privileging of subjectivity (Either/Or I 
154 / Enten-Eller I 153). The ancient Antigone, according to Kierkegaard, “is not at all 
preoccupied with her father’s unfortunate fate” (“beskæftiger . . . sig slet ikke med 
Faderens ulykkelige Skjæbne”), which is a properly Greek attitude since, “[t]o them, life 
relationships, like the horizon under which they live, are given once and for all. Even 
though this is dark and full of clouds, it is also unchangeable” (“Livsforholdene ere dem 
eengang givne ligesom den Horizont, under hvilken de leve. Er denne end dunkel og 
skyfuld, saa er den tillige uforanderlig”; 155-6, trans. modified / 154). The modern 
Antigone, on the other hand, constantly assimilates and internalizes the ambiguity of the 
tragic situation by questioning it.  
The same condition determines the modern version’s construction of guilt. In 
both Kierkegaard and Sophocles’ version, Antigone knows of Oedipus’ crime, and 
neither of them can determine the extent to which it is an outcome of his individual 
agency or fate. What Kierkegaard adds to his version is that Antigone does not know 
whether Oedipus was conscious of his situation and whether, therefore, he might not 
deliberately have carried out his destiny. The modern Antigone is therefore explicitly 
confronted with the impossibility of determining the extent to which the circumstances 
were the outcome of her father’s agency or merely the consequence of forces that 
exceed him. As Kierkegaard puts it: 
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[W]hile [Oedipus] was living, [Antigone] could not confide her sorrow to him, 
for she indeed did not know whether he knew it, and consequently there was 
the possibility of immersing him in a similar pain. And yet, if he had not 
known it, the guilt would be less. The movement here is continually relative. If 
Antigone had not definitely known the factual context, she would have been 
trivial, she would then have had nothing but a suspicion to struggle with, and 
that is too little to engage us tragically. But she knows everything; yet within 
this knowledge there is still an ignorance that can always keep the sorrow in 
motion, always transform it into pain. (161)  
Men medens Faderen levede, har hun ikke kunnet betroe ham sin Sorg; thi 
hun vidste jo ikke, om han var vidende derom, og altsaa var der en Mulighed 
for at nedstyrte ham i en lignende Smerte. Og dog, dersom han ikke har 
været vidende derom, var Skylden mindre. Bevægelsen er her bestandig 
relativ. Dersom Antigone ikke med Bestemthed vidste det factiske 
Sammenhæng, saa blev hun ubetydelig, hun vilde da ikke have andet end en 
Ahnelse at kæmpe med, og det er for lidt til tragisk at beskæftige os. Men 
hun veed Alt; men indenfor denne Viden er der dog en Uvidenhed, der altid 
kan holde Sorgen i Bevægelsen, altid forvandle den til Smerte. (159) 
To both ancient and modern versions, the “factual context” is the same: the patricide, 
the incest, even the oracle. What differs is only that Kierkegaard’s Antigone cannot 
accept that factual context as a mute given, because she cannot be sure whether her 
father knew all of it and therefore whether he served as the intentional agent of his fate. 
The final category of action is conditioned by a similar dilemma. The modern 
Antigone is caught between duty to her father—which counts as a substantial 
determination of the individual as a member of a larger group—and her love for 
Haemon—which is a subjective condition applicable only to herself and generated by 
her particular preferences and inclinations. These two relations place opposing 
demands on her, since she would have to keep her father’s secret out of filial piety but 
must reveal it if she is to marry Haemon in good conscience. Unable to determine what 
the situation is and therefore where her obligations lie, Kierkegaard’s Antigone is left 
silent and immobile, and meets her death unable to commit to either side: “[A]ction 
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becomes impossible for the tragic individual” (“Handling bliver umulig for det tragiske 
Individ”; 164 / 162).  
Antigone’s immobility is perhaps the clearest image that we have of the 
difference at stake between Kierkegaard’s theory of tragedy and Schelling’s early 
philosophy of streben. As intimated before, streben in Schelling arises from the fact that, 
within experience, the I is confronted by representations that it seems not to control, in 
the basic sense that we encounter attributes not explicable in terms of the principles 
operative in our understanding. Once we find explanations for such phenomena, 
however, the domain of the I is expanded, since we are now able to account for a larger 
part of experience in terms of rules compatible with our own agency. This process of 
knowledge, which culminates in the category of necessity exhibited by organic forms 
and discussed above, depends on what Schelling calls a pre-established harmony 
between the I and world, which guarantees the possibility of translating the terms of one 
into those of the other (Vom Ich 130-1). In the absence of such harmony, however, the 
possibility of recognizing reason in the irrational must disappear, and the consequence 
becomes not progress but paralysis. 
This contrast is drawn explicitly by Kierkegaard’s text in what is perhaps its most 
remarkable moment, A’s exhortation to his audience. At the mid-point of the essay, in 
the transition from the descriptive to the prescriptive discussion of tragedy, A delivers 
the following monstrous sentence:19 
Since it is at variance with the aims of our association [the 
Symparamekromenoi] to provide coherent works or larger unities, since it is 
not our intention to labor on a Tower of Babel that God in his righteousness 
can descend and destroy, since we, in our consciousness that such 
confusion justly occurred, acknowledge as characteristic of all human 
endeavor in its truth that it is fragmentary, that it is precisely this which 
distinguishes it from nature’s infinite coherence, that an individual’s wealth 
consists specifically in his capacity for fragmentary prodigality and what is the 
producing individual’s enjoyment is the receiving individual’s also, not the 
laborious and careful accomplishment or the tedious interpretation of this 
accomplishment but the production and the pleasure of the glinting 
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transiency, which for the producer holds much more than the consummated 
accomplishment, since it is a glimpse of the idea and holds a bonus for the 
recipient, since its fulguration stimulates his own productivity – since all this, I 
say, is at variance with our association’s inclination, indeed, since the 
periodic sentence just read must almost be regarded as a serious attack on 
the ejaculatory style in which the idea breaks forth without achieving a 
breakthrough, to which officiality is attached in our society – therefore, after 
having pointed out that my conduct cannot be called mutinous, inasmuch as 
the bond that holds this periodic sentence together is so loose that the 
parenthetical clauses therein strut about aphoristically and willfully enough, I 
shall merely call to mind that my style has made an attempt to appear to be 
what it is not: revolutionary. (151-2)  
Da det strider mod vor Forenings Bestræbelse at levere sammenhængende 
Arbeider eller større Heelheder, da vor Tendens ikke er at arbeide paa et 
babylonisk Taarn, som Gud i sin Retfærdighed kan stige ned og ødelægge, 
da vi i Bevidsthed af, at hiin Forvirring skete med Rette, anerkjende det som 
det Eiendommelige for al menneskelig Stræben i sin Sandhed, at den er 
fragmentarisk, at det netop er det, hvorved den adskiller sig fra Naturens 
uendelige Sammenhæng; at en Individualitets Rigdom netop bestaar i dens 
Kraft i fragmentarisk Ødeslhed, og at det, der er det producerende Individs 
Nydelse, ogsaa er det reciperende Individs, ikke den besværlige og nøiagtige 
Udførelse, eller den langvarige Opfattelse af denne Udførelse, men 
Frembringelsen og Nydelsen af den glimtende Flygtighed, der for den 
Frembringende indeholder et Mere end hvad den gjennemførte Udførelse 
har, da den er Ideens Apparens, for den Reciperende indeholder et Mere, da 
dens Fulguration vækker hans egen Productivitet – da Alt dette, siger jeg, 
strider mod vor Forenings Tendens, ja, da næsten den forelæste Periode 
maa ansees for et betænkeligt Attentat paa den Interjections-Stiil, hvori Ideen 
bryder ud, uden at komme til Gjennembrud, der i vort Samfund er tillagt 
Officialitet, saa vil jeg, efter at have gjort opmærksom paa, at min Adfærd 
dog ikke kan kaldes oprørsk, da det Baand, der sammenholder denne 
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Periode, er saa løst, at de indeholdte Mellemsætninger stritte aphoristisk og 
egenraadigt nok frem, blot erindre om, at min Stiil har gjort et Forsøg paa, 
tilsyneladende at være, hvad den ikke er – revolutionair. (150-1)  
Two points of importance for the preceding discussion can be derived from this 
passage, both of which are again obscured by the translation. The first is A’s claim, 
towards the opening of the sentence, that the central tenet of the fellowship of buried 
lives to which he belongs is that “all human endeavor in its truth…is fragmentary” (151 / 
150). In the original, the word for “endeavor” is “Stræben,” the Danish cognate for 
Schelling’s streben, and A’s claim is that such fragmentary striving is to be preferred 
because it stands in a closer relation than does “consummate accomplishment” to what 
he calls “the idea” (152 / 152). At first sight, this would seem to resonate with Schelling’s 
claim that striving serves to reveal the absolute, but towards the end of the essay the 
nature of the “idea” in question for A becomes apparent when he goes on to equate the 
fellowship of living dead to his essay’s heroine, the modern Antigone:  
My dear [Symparanekromenoi], have I not managed to capture your interest 
for such a maiden, or shall I resort to a captatio benevolentiae? She, too, 
does not belong to the world in which she lives; although healthy and 
flourishing, her real life is nevertheless hidden. She, too, although alive, is in 
another sense dead; her life is quiet and concealed. (157) 
Skulde det ikke være lykkedes mig, kjære [Symparanekromenoi], at vinde 
Eders Interesse for en saadan Pige, eller skal jeg tye til en captatio 
benevolentiæ? Ogsaa hun tilhører ikke den Verden, hvori hun lever, om end 
blomstrende og sund er dog hendes egentlige Liv et forborgent, ogsaa hun 
er, skjøndt levende, i en anden Forstand afdød, stille er dette Liv og skjult . . . 
(155)  
The reasons for this identification with the modern Antigone should be clear in light of 
the preceding discussion: if there is no access to the absolute, then there can be no 
recuperation of its structure within the realm of finitude and thus no striving in 
Schelling’s sense. The only thing that can be laid bare is the absence of a unifying 
ground, which also means that any pretence to the contrary is only a way of hiding the 
paralysis that is the truth of our condition. In truth, our activity never gets us anywhere, 
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which is also to say that the condition of streben, striving, is nothing but a sterben, 
dying: the paralysis of the living dead. 
The second point that can be taken from A’s long exhortation to the audience 
centers on the claim towards the end of the sentence that, contrary to appearances, his 
style has not been revolutionary or mutinous. The English translation limits the scope of 
A’s claim to “the periodic sentence just read” and “this periodic sentence,” but in the 
Danish original, A in both cases simply uses the noun “Periode,” without the 
specification of “sentence.” Granted, “Periode” can refer to sentences or parts thereof, 
but, as in English, it also has the more general meaning of a determined sequence of 
time (Ordbog, def. 2) and could, therefore, indicate that A has in mind everything of the 
essay that precedes his statement. In either case, it is clear that a revolutionary style is 
one that fails to adhere to the society’s embrace of the “fragmentary” nature of human 
striving and instead exhibits “laborious and careful accomplishment” or “consummated 
accomplishment.” A’s assurance, accordingly, is that although it might appear as though 
he has been writing in a coherent and systematic manner, the bond that holds the parts 
of his argument together “is so loose that the parenthetical clauses therein strut about 
aphoristically and willfully enough.” The systematic analysis of the categories of mood, 
action, and guilt that dominates the essay up until this point, and which A picks up again 
immediately after his exhortation, is in this way challenged by A himself and said to be 
anything but as coherent as we might have thought, and in the end not really meant.20  
By drawing attention to the presence of two different argumentative strategies at 
the mid-point of his text, in a sentence of such monstrous construction that the reader 
must inevitably reread and reflect, A suddenly reveals that “The Tragic in Ancient 
Drama” is operating with all the elements ascribed to modern tragedy. First, we have 
the contradiction between, on the one hand, the rational, systematic exposition of the 
topic in its necessary moments and, on the other, the contingent and playful 
interventions of its author. Second, we are explicitly made aware of this contradiction in 
terms that cannot be easily be pinned down and the status of which is anything but 
certain. The form of Kierkegaard’s essay in this way approximates the form of modern 
tragedy itself, and in this sense can be read as a further challenge to Schelling’s early 
project. According to the latter, philosophy must be governed by the requirement that it 
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begin from an absolutely certain principle and derive all other moments from it in a 
coherent and systematic way (System 15-6; Über die Möglichkeit 16).21 Philosophy in 
that form must mirror the absolute itself, and its completion constitutes the full exhibition 
of that metaphysical ground, the speculative counterpart to the aesthetic work of art 
(System 18-9). In Kierkegaard, however, as we have seen, the absolute is radically 
other, which means that not only tragedy but philosophy too must take a different 
shape. Philosophy here cannot consist in systematic deductions, in the exhibition of the 
way that the contingencies of life in fact follow a necessary law. Rather, it occurs in the 
tension between systematicity and fragmentation, necessity and chance, and in the 
reflection on that gap.  
                                                
1 This essay is the most exhaustive and detailed discussion of tragedy and the tragic in 
2 Steiner (54) and Rehm (278-9) have also noted that Kierkegaard’s argument draws on 
a longer tradition surrounding the difference between the ancients and the moderns, but 
they do not indicate that his contribution changes the terms of that debate in any way. 
For an overview of the distinction between ancients and moderns during the Goethezeit, 
see Szondi, Antike.  
3 Unless otherwise noted, all translations in this article are my own. 
4 On the reception of the Querelle in Germany, see Pago. 
5 Jauss points to Saint-Évremond’s 1692 essay “De la tragédie ancienne et moderne” 
as the earliest and most consistent formulation of the qualitative difference between 
moderns and ancients that settles the Querelle and gives birth to a new conception of 
history (34-5, 62-3). In that essay, Saint-Évremond significantly defines ancient drama 
in terms of its reliance on divine forces, while the moderns ought to opt for the unique 
human as their proper theme (cf. esp. 175-6). 
6 That Kierkegaard’s essay on the tragic contains a critique of the notion of modernity at 
large is likewise suggested from another perspective by Gonzáles (109). 
7 Steiner does proceed to argue for a difference between Hegel and Kierkegaard and 
finds it in what appears to be the claim that Kierkegaard wants to unify the aesthetic and 
the ethical (and perhaps also the religious) in a Hegelian sublation (55-6). 
8 Holm goes on to specify a difference to Hegel in the claim that filial piety for 
Kierkegaard is no longer articulated in terms of moral obligations but rather in terms of 
the sins that bind children to their fathers (154-5). But this difference does not appear to 
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change the fact that both filial piety and loyalty to the state are substantive principles. 
That Kierkegaard’s conception of ancient (and modern) drama is taken from Hegel is 
also asserted by Harries (54-5). In a related manner, Luzzatto reads Kierkegaard’s 
version of Antigone essentially as an extension of Sophocles’ play, although he does 
not draw on Hegel for his understanding of the latter. 
9 Gonzáles is one of the few commentators to rightfully emphasize the centrality to 
Kierkegaard’s argument of the simultaneity of qualitatively opposed principles (119). 
10 Kierkegaard’s relation to Schelling is a vast area of research, although most of the 
focus has been on the influence of Schelling’s late philosophy on Kierkegaard’s thought 
(not least because Kierkegaard in 1841-1842 attended Schelling’s lectures in Berlin). 
For a detailed reconstruction and bibliography on this topic, see Olsen.  
11 What such a religious relation to the absolute looks like for Kierkegaard and what 
consequences it might have for aesthetics is the topic of my book Marginal Modernity. 
12 All references to the Kritik der reinen Vernunft follow the convention of listing page 
numbers in the first edition (A) followed by those in the second after the slash (B). 
13 Kant writes: “Die Kategorien der Modalität haben das Besondere an sich: daß sie den 
Begriff, dem sie als Prädikate beigefüget werden, als Bestimmung des Objekts nicht im 
mindesten vermehren, sondern nur das Verhältnis zum Erkenntnisvermögen 
ausdrücken. Wenn der Begriff eines Dinges schon ganz vollständig ist, so kann ich 
doch noch von diesem Gegenstande fragen, ob er bloß möglich, oder auch wirklich, 
oder, wenn er das letztere ist, ob er gar auch notwendig sei? Hierdurch werden keine 
Bestimmungen mehr im Objekte selbst gedacht, sondern es frägt sich nur, wie es sich 
(samt allen seinen Bestimmungen) zum Verstande und dessen empirischen 
Gebrauche, zur empirischen Urteilskraft, und zur Vernunft (in ihrer Anwendung auf 
Erfahrung) verhalte?” (A219 / B266). 
14 On this point, see also Geißler (73, 77). For a more extensive discussion of the 
relation of the unconditioned to empirical self-consciousness in Schelling, see Frank 
(48-60). Sandkaulen-Bock in particular has pointed out that the transition from the 
former to the latter that Schelling wants to provide in his early works is anything but 
unproblematic (44-5, et passim).  
15 While both organisms and works of art can serve this function due to their exhibition 
of necessity, Schelling in the System des transzendentalen Idealsmus ultimately grants 
primacy to the latter. The reason for this is that art not only represents the identity of 
thought and being, the artist’s conscious and unconscious activity, but also exhibits it as 
located within the artist’s consciousness, which is to say the I itself, rather than leaving 
the source of that identity in nature, the non-I that opposes us as other (281-2). In his 
posthumously published Philosophie der Kunst, from 1802-1803, Schelling provides an 
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extensive discussion of specifically tragedy as the artistic form that represents the 
absolute most directly (518ff.), although this privileging of the genre goes back already 
to his Philosophische Briefe über Dogmatismus und Kriticismus, from 1795. For a 
discussion of the relationship of Kierkegaard’s essay on the tragic to Schelling’s more 
particular arguments about this genre, see Chapter 8 of my book The Fate of Suffering: 
Form, Philosophy, History in Modern Tragedy, currently in preparation. 
16 Michel Kosch has convincingly argued that a shift in the notion of freedom along 
these lines in fact marks the watershed dividing Kierkegaard’s thought from that of the 
early Schelling and idealism more generally. While I find Kosch’s overall argument 
compelling, I disagree with her claim that the aesthetic mode of existence in 
Kierkegaard, to which the essay on the tragic in Either/Or belongs, should be 
understood as endorsing the position of the early Schelling. Kosch’s argument for this 
claim primarily rests on the account of the aesthetic given by the representative of the 
opposing ethical view in Either/Or, Judge William, which cannot, on my reading, be 
taken at face value. Indeed, Kosch’s most important textual evidence comes from the 
Judge’s paraphrase of a passage from Schelling’s System des transzendentalen 
Idealismus to characterize the aesthetic mode of life (Kosch 148; Either/Or 2 137 / 
Enten-Eller 2 135). But that passage is explicitly said by the Judge not to describe the 
aesthetic as it is represented by the aesthete himself, but rather the aesthetic as it is 
realized within the ethical; that is, it designates the Judge’s own life-view rather than 
that of A. The aesthetic, on the contrary, as I argue here, is explicitly rejecting the 
position endorsed in Schelling’s System, and in my view does so for philosophical 
reasons that Kierkegaard himself thinks are valid and which he uses in his defense of 
the religious. With respect to the latter point, see my Marginal 49-51. 
17 For a discussion of historical faith and its distinction from religious faith proper, see 
my Marginal Modernity 46-53. 
18 Szondi is thus correct in his perceptive assertion that Kierkegaard does away with the 
moment of reconciliation in his theory of tragedy (Versuch 39). For the same reason, I 
would disagree with Gonzáles’ claim in relation to “The Tragic in Ancient Drama” that 
Kierkegaard does not provide “un pensamiento de la separación absoluta del hombre 
con respecto a su origen divino” (107). 
19 Manheimer (105-6) and Harries (58-9) are to my knowledge the only commentators 
on the essay that note the importance of this sentence. 
20 That Kierkegaard’s argument in “The Tragic in Ancient Drama” can be read as playful 
has also been pointed out by Gonzáles (110-1). 
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21 For an extensive analysis of the requirement of systematicity in German idealism in 
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